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Introduction  
The work described in this report was commissioned by Banedanmark (BDK) in October 2011 and has been 
prepared November 2011-January 2012 by the authors. Banedanmark has proposed and contributed to the 
selection of generic tasks and performance shaping factors; Banedanmark has also provided examples of 
concrete tasks that are described in the report and are intended to serve as instances of the respective generic 
tasks under which they are listed. Finally, Banedanmark has provided essential input to the scoping of report 
and indispensable feedback to early drafts. 
The generic tasks that are listed and analyzed in this report have been selected to represent tasks that are, 
first, applicable to the rail domain and, second, specifically representative of operator tasks following the 
changes to Danish railways operations upon adoption of the Signalling Programme. The report is therefore 
intended to support BDK within the Signalling Programme in hazard analysis and in the preparation and criti-
que of specific safety levels arguments as part of the design and of procedures and associated skills and train-
ing requirements of the new signalling systems. 
There are few empirical data (historic records or simulation-based) or expert judgment data available that 
exactly matches the generic tasks provided.  Therefore, the estimates provided in this report are based on 
extrapolation from the error rates provided in the HRA literature, primarily from HEART.   For each estimate, 
sources and the extrapolation are described.  
The choice of a first-generation method such as HEART might perhaps be questioned in the light of advances in 
HRA methods and techniques since the appearance of HEART more than 25 years ago. First-generation 
methods focus on the skill and rule based level of human action and are often criticized for failing to consider  
the impact of context, safety culture and other organizational factors and, not least, so-called errors of com-
mission. Such errors arise typically when an operator misjudges (wrong diagnosis, faulty situation awareness) a 
complex, abnormal situation and then, with the best intentions, performs acts that increase risks or perhaps 
even produce an accident. Techniques such as HEART are designed to capture and quantify the risk of failing to 
perform required actions and are not well suitable to predict and capture actions performed by operators out-
side the scope of predefined or predicted task scenarios. But for a new and yet to be deployed application 
such as the Signalling Programme it is appropriate to begin by applying a first-generation method, whereas the 
more complex application of methods that may capture lack of resilience against more rare and ill-defined 
situations may be better addressed when training with skills and knowledge requirements have been defined. 
For each of the generic task estimates provided, we have performed an independent appraisal of the esti-
mates by selecting from the COREDATA database (Gibson et al. 2006;Williams 1986) a set of estimates of tasks 
that, as far as possible, match the generic tasks The appraisal should not be regarded as a proper validation, 
nor has it been possible in all cases to identify a reasonably large set of tasks (n>20) in the COREDATA 
database that exemplify the generic task in question.  
Note on using HEART for estimates 
The choice of HEART as the primary source of error rates is based on the consideration that this technique 
incorporates the most widely used estimates of error rates of generic tasks; moreover, HEART is the most 
prominent technique used by the RSSB in their studies of HRA applications (Hickling 2007). Finally, a chief 
advantage of HEART is that it provides a task-based analysis with a ‘holistic’ approach (Kirwan 1994) rather 
than a ‘decompositional’ approach focusing on types of error which would require a higher level of detail. 
There are, however, some challenges when using HEART. One challenge is that definitions of GTTs (Generic 
Task Types) are sometimes very specific and complex. In particular, they often include performance shaping 
factors (PSFs), which may lead to a risk of ‘double counting’, i.e., including a PSF in the definition of a generic 
task and subsequently finding a need for using this specific PSF to modify the task for a specific application 
(Cullen et al. 2004:41;Hickling 2007). The risk of double counting can be somewhat controlled by either 
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defining restrictions on the use of PSFs for specific GTTs – and such matrices are already available (Hickling 
2007:66-7) – or by extracting PSFs from GTT definitions & estimates. 
Reversibility and checking 
Another challenge is that HEART estimates seem pessimistic (when compared with UK incident data). Hickling 
has suggested that HEART estimates may be too conservative for railway driving tasks (Hickling 2007:60), 
partly because they do not account for (1) performance improving features such as ‘independent checking’ 
that are already included in the actual task architecture, or for (2) “considerable opportunity to recover from 
an initial error”. 
The first of these reliability enhancing factors – checking – is partly included in one of the PSFs presented in 
this report: ‘supervision’ (see later for further explanation). We shall thus assume that the generic tasks in this 
report do not include supervision and checking, and that such features will require application of the PSF. 
The benefits of supervision will also depend on the second factor, opportunity to recover, or task reversibility, 
since a supervisor would otherwise have limited opportunity to check and correct. We shall – to some extent – 
follow Hickling's assumptions: that HEART estimates do not account for reversibility, and that most tasks 
covered by BDK’s analysis are in fact reversible. 
Hickling argues that “the error probability given in HEART, and the application of HEART in most risk models, 
represents a single opportunity for a task error before an undesired consequence emerges. This is appropriate 
in the context of process control as most assessed task will consist of tasks comprising a number of small 
sequentially executed actions that are often irrecoverable if they are incorrect” (Hickling 2007:61). Hickling’s 
observation about assumed irreversibility in HEART estimates should to some extent be counterbalanced by 
the fact that HEART actually has a PSF for ‘irreversibility’ (EPC 7, *8, see table A.2), implying that generic tasks 
are basically reversible – with task B as the exception, as explained below and in William’s corrective matrix 
(Hickling 2007). We shall nevertheless accept Hickling’s argument about the need to correct (reduce) HEART 
estimates to account for reversibility, although with less than the full multiplier presented in HEART.  
Furthermore, we assume that tasks to be analyzed by BDK are basically reversible, unless specifically and 
explicitly noted to be irreversible. Hickling argues that this is the case for train-driving tasks: “the driver has 
multiple opportunities to respond correctly to a signal, but it is only at the last point where there is insufficient 
time for their action to be effective that the error becomes critical” (Hickling 2007:61). Some might question 
whether this is also true for signalling tasks, as argued by an English supervisor: “essentially once a signaller 
has pressed a button to clear a signal there is little that can be done to rectify a regulation error” (Dickinson & 
Lowe 2007:227). However, BDK argues that problems of irreversibility are be reduced with modern signalling 
systems like CBTC and ERTMS level 2 as continuous radio connection to the onboard equipment introduces the 
options of shortening of movement authorities as well as the remote application of unconditional emergency 
stops. Further mitigating action can be achieved by use of GSM-R voice Railway Emergency Call that automati-
cally connects a controller voice call to a group of drivers within an area – with the option of instructing the 
driver to command their trains to a standstill. It is therefore reasonable to regard the generic tasks described 
in this report as basically reversible – and therefore more receptive to the benefits of supervision.  
Multiplier identified from HEART 
As we have observed, one way of taking account of pessimistic estimates in HEART may be to modify HEART 
estimates to account for checking and opportunity to recover. Hickling suggests identifying a modifier based 
on existing HEART estimates by comparing two complementary GTTs in HEART (Table A.1):  
B ('without supervision or procedures', ‘single attempt’, HEP=0.26), and  
F ('following procedures, with some checking', HEP=0.003).  
Based on the definitions, the difference between B and F seems to represent three positive factors:  
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1) procedures,  
2) supervision (incl. checking) 
3) reversibility (as opposed to ‘single attempt’).  
These three factors together account for the difference in HEP estimates by a factor of about 90. (This is 
rounded up to a multiplier of 100 by Hickling (2007:62)).  
In other words: F = B*procedures*supervision*reversibility (where all three factors are positive and reduce 
error rates, and thus with a value < 1), with the accumulated value: procedures*supervision*reversibility = 
HEP(F)/HEP(B) = 1/90. All three factors are included in this report: reversibility is assumed in generic tasks, 
supervision is a PSF, and procedures are presumed to be included in skill-based and rule-based tasks in the rail 
domain. As will be explained, the PSF ‘job aid’ will be defined as involving an external device or support  (e.g., a 
checklist represented on a memory card; an alarm when a limit is exceeded) and will thus always involve a 
procedure. 
Basic tasks with modified estimates 
Having contrasted Generic tasks B and F, Hickling then identifies Generic task C (‘complex task requiring high 
level of comprehension and skill’) as a ‘baseline cognitive task’ – and modifies it by 1/100 (an approximation 
of the modifier discussed above) to get 0.16/100 = 0.0016. He also identifies Generic task E (‘Routine, highly-
practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level of skill’) as a ‘baseline skilled task’ (HEP=0.02) – and applies 
the same multiplier to get HEP=0.0002. 
Note on using COREDATA for validation of estimates 
We have decided to seek an independent basis for appraising the suggested estimates. To do so, we compare 
the estimates with data sampled from COREDATA (Gibson et al 2006), using a version of the database provided 
by Mr. Huw Gibson, RSSB, to the authors (21st November 2011). A proper validation would require a more 
thorough and rigorous sampling than is possible for the limited time and resources available for the prepara-
tion of this report; nevertheless, the samples provided can be seen as an extra check or triangulation against 
the estimates collected from other sources. 
There are, however, some challenges to this comparison. COREDATA presents probabilities for specific errors 
in specific task scenarios, and there may be several possible errors for each task. Some errors occur at 
different stages of an evolving situations, i.e. with several possibilities for recovery from an initial error. When 
we focus on the error for a specific task with several opportunities for recovery, we should only count those 
errors that are not recovered. 
In this report, we shall only make a crude comparison, and resources are not available to make a more 
detailed analysis of the error rates presented in COREDATA. Such an analysis lies outside the scope of the 
current report, but we shall make some indications about the limitations and possible further analysis. 
Parameters in COREDATA used for selection of records 
The main data in COREDATA are listed in a table of HEP (Human Error Probability) values for different tasks or 
failure types, collected from different studies, 413 records in total. The table also has other attributes that are 
used for selection in this report. 
A number of studies used in COREDATA are dedicated to communication – and some communication-related 
tasks – primarily in Air Traffic Control (studies no. 16, 35-38, 54-56), and one study in railway communication 
(study no. 34). Records from these studies are selected – using the attribute ‘Study ID’ – as the basic sample 
for tasks 3 and 4. 
The attribute ‘Level_of_operation’ has several possible values: ‘Emergency’, ‘Maintenance – Routine’, ‘Main-
tenance – type not identified’, ‘Normal Operation’, ‘Normal/emergency’, ‘Perturbed Operation’ and ‘Various’. 
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This attribute has been used to identify emergency tasks: 93 records are thus captured as exemplifying  
‘Emergency’. 
The attribute ‘Data_Pedigree’ indicates the source of estimates for individual studies with text strings such as 
‘Simulator Task Monitoring’, ‘Incident Data/Near Miss Data’ or ‘Expert Judgment’. This attribute is used to 
identify results based on expert judgment. 
The attribute ‘Task_Familiarity_I’ can be read as indicating task frequency with values: ‘More than once an 
hour’, ‘Daily’, ‘Weekly’, ‘Monthly’, ‘Yearly’, ‘Between 2 and 9 years’, ‘Between 10 and 40 years’ and ‘Unlikely 
during a working lifetime’. For many records (272), however, such data are not available, indicated as ‘Various’ 
or ‘Data not available’ or empty. 
The attribute ‘Procedure_vs_Problemsolve’ is used to rate the degree of problem solving/proceduralisation by 
values 1 to 5, “where 5 is pure problem solving and 1 is highly proceduralised”. For many records (139), 
however, this information is not available, indicated as either ‘Various’ or empty. This attribute is used often in 
this report to distinguish proceduralised tasks from tasks with some degree of problem solving. 
Besides the ‘HEP Table’, a subtable is used to indicate ‘Cognitive error modes’ for some tasks/failure types 
(records in HEP Table), often with more than one error mode for each task/failure. The possible error modes 
are: ‘Attention’, ‘Decision Making’, ‘Long Term Memory’, ‘Short Term Memory’, ‘Perception’ and ‘Response 
Execution’. 
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1. Generic tasks 
In collaboration with Banedanmark (BDK) the authors have identified a small number of generic tasks of 
particular use to BDK.  In the table below we provide an overview of these tasks, their definitions, key refer-
ences and resulting estimates of Human Error Probability (HEP) and, when available, intervals that show the 5-
95 % range. 
There are seven basic tasks, the first (‘task 0’) being a ‘lower limit’ of human performance. 
The next two are basic tasks that do not involve a sense of urgency associated with emergency, and are not 
communication tasks. One is a basic simple routine task, while generic task 2 is a knowledge-based task 
requiring judgment. 
Tasks 3 and 4 are mediated verbal communication tasks representing two different types of – typically radio-
based – communication between a signal man and other operators such as a driver or a track worker in charge 
of a track possession.  
The last two tasks represent different types of emergency tasks that are both characterized by some sense of 
urgency, which will also involve some level of stress. The urgency is induced either by safety-critical situation 
or production pressure (without imminent safety aspects). The main distinction between tasks 5 and 6 is based 
on the degree of urgency as well as the availability of a plan of action and relevant information. 
Table 1. Generic tasks 
Generic tasks 
Title Description HEP References 
0. Human perfor-
mance limit 
Highest obtainable reliability (minimal error rates). 1E-4 (single) 
1E-5 (team) 
(Kirwan 1994) 
1. Simple routine Simple, familiar and frequent task 
skill-based or rule-based, for which procedures are available 
 
4E-4 
(0.00014-
0.0009) 
HEART, 
(Hickling 2007) 
2.Nontrivial familiar Familiar, relatively frequent task, requiring knowledge-
based performance and judgment. 
(Normal tasks involving a deviation from planned opera-
tions.) 
1.6E-2 
(0.012-0.028) 
 
HEART, 
(Hickling 2007) 
 
3. Communication, 
routine 
Familiar content routinely conveyed, and where at least a 
limited template for communication is available, and error 
capture and correction is possible. 
6 E-3 
 
(Kirwan et al. 
2004;Kirwan & 
Gibson 2007) 
 
4. Communication, 
nonroutine 
Unforeseen, novel content, where no template – or only a 
rudimentary one – is available. 3 E-2 
(Kirwan 1994) 
5. Emergency 
scenarios - known 
Task characterized by some urgency and stress due to 
safety or production concerns, for which a plan of action (a 
template, a script) and relevant information are available. 
1 E-1 (Kirwan 1994) 
6. Emergency 
scenarios - 
unknown 
Task characterized by high degree of urgency and stress due 
to safety or production concerns, where no adequate plan 
of action (a template, a script) is available, and relevant 
information is uncertain or missing. 
3E-1 (Kirwan 1994) 
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When using the generic tasks to analyze actual tasks in Banedanmark the HEP values are to be modified by 
performance shaping factors as appropriate to take account of the presence of supervision, time pressure, job 
aids and/or task competition. Basically, all generic tasks do thus not include these performance factors. In 
some cases, however, we will discuss possible overlaps between generic task descriptions and PSFs. 
Generic task 0: Human performance limit 
Definition 
Highest obtainable reliability (minimal error rates). 
References 
Kirwan suggest two different ‘human performance limits’, one for a single operator and a lower value for 
teams (see Table A.3 of appendix A): 
• '17. Human performance limit: single operator' (HEP =1E-4)  
• '18. Human performance limit: team of operators performing a well-designed task, very good PSFs, etc.' 
(HEP=1E-5) 
Generic task 1: Simple routine  
Definition 
Simple, familiar and frequent task performed at the skill-based or rule-based level1
There is no time pressure assumed here. However, the task may be embedded in a time pressure task 
scenario, and in this case the increased error rate may be accounted for by the corresponding PSF. Alterna-
tively, if there is some urgency and stress involved in specific task, then it properly belongs to task 5. 
, for which procedures are 
available.  
Communication tasks are not covered by this task. 
References 
Two Generic Task Types (GTT) in HEART (see table A.1) seem to cover the most routine tasks:  
• G (familiar, frequent, adequate time, without 'job aid'; HEP=4E-4),  
• E (Routine, highly practiced, rapid, low skill level); HEP = 2E-2.  
Mention of ‘rapidity’ in the definition of task E seems to imply both Time Pressure (TP) and no or low reversi-
bility, suggesting HEP may be lower for reversible tasks without time pressure (defined as a PSF in this report). 
In other words: E(HEART) = task1*TP*irreversibility (where both factors are negative and thus with a value > 
1). Thus, we shall modify (reduce) HEP for task E to account for task 1 characteristics: reversibility and lack of 
time pressure. Similarly, Hickling suggest modifying task E to get a ‘baseline skilled task’ (Hickling 2007:63), 
although we cannot simply apply Hicklings modifier (0.01), since it represents two other factors besides rever-
sibility: procedures, supervision/checking.  
Furthermore, two types of error from Kirwan’s generic guideline data (Table A.3) are relevant for this task: 
 
                                                            
1 The distinctions between skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based performance are based on Rasmussen’s model 
(Rasmussen 1986) and “well-known and liked”, and experience shows that they “support a HEART like quantification 
phase” (Hickling 2007:32)  
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• ’12. Error of omission of an act embedded in a procedure’ (HEP=3E-3).  
• ‘14. Error in simple routine operation’ (HEP=1E-3) 
The definition of Kirwans error 12 is based on one specific error type (rather than task type): there will often 
be several possible errors for one task, e.g. the task can fail in other ways than omission. One may thus express 
the full error rate of a corresponding task ‘kirwan12’ (‘act embedded in a procedure’): HEP(kirwan12) = 
HEP(error12) + x, where HEP(error12) is the value presented above, and where x represents the probability of 
other errors for the same task. Furthermore, Kirwan refers to a procedure, which our task1 doesn’t. Thus, if 
task1 is similar in other characteristics to Kirwan’s task 12 then the following applies: procedure*HEP(task1) = 
HEP(error12)+x, where ‘procedure’ represents an improvement and thus a value < 1. 
Estimates 
We base our estimates on HEART probabilities for the reasons explained in the introduction. We shall follow 
Hicklings suggestion and use a modification of task E. For this modification a reduced version of Hicklings 
modifier (see p. Fejl! Bogmærke er ikke defineret.) is applied, representing only procedures, reversibility and 
adequate time, without supervision: 0.02.  
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
HEP (task1) = 4E-4, interval: 0.00014-0.0009. 
• Driver parks train, apply runaway protection 
• Driver evaluates train safe and fit for service 
• Signalman adds control room log entry 
• PICOP using handheld terminal to request pre-planned possession  
• PICOP placing dual-faced stop markers indicating the limits of a work site 
• Watchman at lookout duty warns of approaching train 
• Signalman manually routing trains on interlocked routes 
• Track worker passing tracks at staff crossing 
• Driver observing trackside markers 
• Driver readying for departure, closing doors 
• Track worker staying within defined safe workzone 
• Signalman performing manual route release for unused route 
• Signalman manually throwing point 
• O&M Coordinator resets axel counter 
Sampled records 
Selection criteria 
COREDATA contains a total of 413 records. We have excluded: 
• all 116 records involving communication failures (from communication studies). 
• all 92 records involving emergency tasks are excluded (and reserved for tasks 5 and 6).  
These selections result in a set of non-communication and non-emergency records, a total of 205 (413 – 116 - 
92) records. 
From this set, two different sets are chosen to provide examples of familiar and frequent tasks: 
1) Expert judgments. A study based on expert judgments by 19 experts with an average of eleven years 
of experience (Comer et al. 1984) was selected: 19 records
7
, all indicated as highly proceduralised 
(value=2, see p. ). 
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2) Weekly or more frequently. Tasks that are performed weekly or more frequent, highly proceduralised 
(1 or 2) and not based on expert judgments. For this set, those with task frequency (see p.7) ‘hourly’, 
‘daily’ or ‘weekly’ were selected. Furthermore, six records were based on expert judgment and these 
were excluded to distinguish clearly from the previous set. This selection results in a total of 22 
records
1. Diagram for study based on expert judgments 
. 
See Appendix B for the list of sampled records (p.35) 
 
Median of HEP: 0.003 
2. Diagram for tasks performed weekly or more frequently 
See Appendix B for the list of sampled records (p.35). 
 
Median of HEP: 0.022 
0,0000001 
0,000001 
0,00001 
0,0001 
0,001 
0,01 
0,1 
1 Normal routine - Examples based on expert 
judgement 
0,000001 
0,00001 
0,0001 
0,001 
0,01 
0,1 
1 Normal routine - Tasks performed weekly 
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Comments on estimate, data and method 
Medians for both samples are higher than the suggested estimate, the first sample by a factor of almost 8, the 
second sample (‘weekly’) by a factor of 50. 
The first sample is limited to a specific study of a narrow range of tasks with no consideration for opportunities 
for recovery. The selection for the second sample is also limited, because only few records in COREDATA have 
direct information about frequency (parameter: ‘familiarity’). The sample may thus be biased, with undue 
focus on a minority of studies where this parameter is used, e.g. many examples of input failure when using a 
keypad. There is also a general difficulty in comparing error types with task types (see previous discussion). 
A more appropriate sample would require a more detailed analysis of records (titles and summaries), as well 
as a careful exclusion of outliers, e.g. ‘not recover from error’, which is related to a previous error and thus 
part of a cutest. However, such analysis is beyond the scope of this report. 
In any case, the provided estimate is reasonably based on the references and justified by the first sample. 
Generic task 2: Nontrivial, familiar  
Definition 
Familiar and relatively frequent task performed at the knowledge-based level; hence requires judgment. 
Comparable to what Banedanmark has described as: normal tasks performed fairly often, but nevertheless a 
deviation from planned operations. 
The task is by default not stressful or urgent; but time pressure may be added as a PSF. It is should be noted 
that time pressure alone may not necessarily involve stress.   
Voice communication tasks are not included. 
Emphasis on deviation and judgment indicates a less firm structure with less clearly applicable rules than task 
1, which implies different conditions for application of the corresponding PSF: Job aid. This does not mean that 
there are fewer rules for this task type, since degraded operation tends to elicit a lot of rules (at least as far as 
anticipated situations are concerned). 
Higher complexity than task 1. 
References 
Two GTTs in HEART (see table A.1) indicate various types of degradation from routine operation:  
• D (simple, rapid or scant attention; HEP=9E-2)  
• C (complex, high comprehension/skill; HEP=0.16).  
In the definition of task D, the term ‘rapid’ indicates time pressure (defined as a PSF in this report), while 
‘simple’ on the other hand indicates a task less complicated than task2. In other words: D ≅ task2*simple*TP, 
where ‘simple’ is < 1 (improving) and TP > 1 (deteriorating). 
Hickling suggests a modification of task C as a baseline cognitive task (Hickling 2007:63). As already mentioned, 
this modification (0.01) is based on the assumption that normal tasks include: procedures, super-
vision/checking, reversibility (see previous discussion), whereas we only presume reversibility. 
Yet another example of a slightly degraded operation can be found in Kirwan’s generic guideline data (table 
A.3): '11. Error in a routine operation where care is required' (HEP=1E-2). 
The mention of ‘care’ may represent some judgment corresponding to task2. On the other hand, task2 is not 
‘routine’ in the sense of ‘automatic’ action: Kirwan11 ≅ task2*routine, where routine < 1. 
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Estimates 
We shall again prefer HEART estimates for the same reasons as for task 1, following Hicklings suggestion of a 
modified task C, although with our more modest modifier of 0.1 representing reversibility. 
HEP (task2) = 1.6E-2, interval: 0.012-0.028
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
. 
• Signalman plan/establish temporary speed restriction 
• Signalman authorising operational trailing 
• Signalman manually setting up route protection prior to routing trains on Signalman protected routes 
• Signalman applying wind restrictions 
• Driver manually controlling brakes under low adhesion conditions 
• Driver controlling train in RM (Restricted Mode) and brakes towards End of Authority 
• Driver controlling train under on-sight conditions 
• Driver isolating onboard equipment 
• PICOP request impromptu possession on handheld terminal 
• Signalman plan/apply impromptu possession  
• Driver apply clamp to point 
• Signalman determine conditions for resetting axel counter 
• Signalman applying system override 
• O&M Coordinator de-activating low adhesion area 
 
Sampled records 
Selection criteria 
Records are selected from the non-emergency, non-communication set of 205 records (presented above). 
As examples of nontrivial tasks, tasks with some degree of problem solving have been selected. Out of 205 
records (without communication studies or emergency tasks), none were rated 5, two were rated 4, and 11 
were rated 3. This results in a total of 13 records
See Appendix B for the list of sampled records (p.
.  
36). 
Diagram showing distribution of modes and probability intervals 
 0,0001 
0,001 
0,01 
0,1 
1 
Some amount of problemsolving 
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Median of HEP: 0.003 
Comments on estimate, data and method 
HEP is lower (5 times) than expected – equal to ‘normal routine’ samples based on expert judgment. A reason 
may be that the selection based on ‘problem solving’ parameter is limited, since only few records have this 
information. 
The sample could be improved (not within the scope of this report) by analyzing records by titles and task 
summaries to select more relevant examples, or making a search based on ‘cognitive error modes’ (see p.7), 
selecting errors in ‘decision making’. However, a quick search revealed, against our expectations, that the two 
dimensions – ‘problem solving’ and ‘decision making’ – are not directly compatible in the database: tasks 
indicated with low degree of problem solving are also indicated as failures in decision making. This search 
indicates that we cannot rely solely on either of the parameters, but will have to analyze titles and tasks 
summaries in any case. 
In any case, our estimate is reasonably based on the references, and results from the sample are not 
dramatically lower. 
Generic task 3: Communication, routine 
Definition 
Communication about familiar contents frequently conveyed that is carried by voice and typically two-way. 
Some limited template for communication may be available, e.g. predefined ‘elements’ such as identification, 
message and readback. Error capture and correction is possible (hence, error estimates refer to uncorrected 
errors). 
Note: Communication tasks (both 3 and 4) may often overlap with other generic tasks, both the two emer-
gency tasks 5 and 6 and non-emergency tasks 1 and 2. In general, it is recommended to isolate communication 
from other elements of a larger task. For example, communication and emergency tasks intersect, and emer-
gency communication might therefore be classified either within communication or emergency generic tasks. 
We recommend selecting communication as generic task, and then add PSFs (e.g. ‘task competition’ and ‘time 
pressure’) to account for urgency; however, if communication plays a minor role compared to other task 
aspects, it will be more appropriate to place such a task within the emergency generic tasks. 
This task includes one-way communication in which a message must be transferred from a sender (e.g. 
signalman) to a receiver (e.g. driver). 
Note on PSF job aid: This generic task involves in its definition a procedure or template (phraseology, sequence 
of communication elements such as caller ID, location etc.), compared to task 4.  However, if job aid (physical 
checklist, written orders) is available, the PSF job aid should be applied. 
Rail communication is comparable to Air Traffic Control communication, which is, however, more structured 
and involves mandatory phraseology to a much greater extent. 
References 
Communication is often treated as a performance factor rather than a task type, e.g. in the RSSB tool for 
Human Error Identification (Cullen et al 2004:Appendix 5). However, communication ‘factors’ have 
disappeared in RSSB’s Quantification tool, where they are translated to individual factors (Cullen et al 
2004:Appendix 11). Yet Cullen et al also have a performance factor for ‘Information quality & availability’ – “of 
information given in procedure or via verbal communication (or other method), including shift handover” = *3 
(Cullen et al 2004:122). 
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However, an appropriate estimate for communication tasks can be found in the CARA (Controller Action 
Reliability Assessment) tool, which is an application of HEART for air traffic safety management (Kirwan & 
Gibson 2007):  
‘9 communication of safety critical data’, HEP = 6 E-3  – with estimate based on data from EUROCONTROL real 
time simulation (Kirwan & Gibson 2007:209). 
Note that air traffic communication is highly structured, routine and basically one-way, whereas railway 
communication only occurs in exceptional situations, traffic normally being automatically regulated by 
signalling systems. Nevertheless, identical estimates has also been applied for other areas, e.g. in NARA 
(Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment) (Kirwan et al 2004;Kirwan 2008:14). 
Estimates 
We suggest the estimate from NARA and CARA from the above sources: 
HEP (task3) = 6E-3
It may be considered modifying this estimate, increasing it to take account of the lower degree of structure 
and routine in railway communication, in particular the low degree implied in task 3. Yet it is difficult to justify 
a specific modifier. 
. 
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
• Signalman receive information on need for speed restriction 
• Signalman/PICOP communication on planned possession 
• Driver reporting location 
• Driver receiving timetable update 
• PICOP report changes to driving conditions 
• Signalman routes call to appropriate Signalman 
• Identify receiver/sender using train radio 
• Signalman to signalman handover 
• Signalman authorising Driver to reverse within the authorised reverse limit (platform overrun) 
Sampled records 
Selection criteria 
Communication: Examples of this task and generic task 4 are communication failures identified as records 
from studies of communication (see p.7). In total, 116 records
Routine communication records are identified by selecting tasks that are rated as highly proceduralised (‘1’ or 
‘2’, see previous discussion), yielding 
. 
19 records
See Appendix B for the list of sampled records (p. 
. 
36). 
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Diagram showing distribution of modes and probability intervals 
 
Median of HEP=0.002 
Comments on estimate, data and method 
The median for the sample is lower (3 times) – better – than the estimate provided. This may be because most 
of the errors are related to highly structured, routine communication tasks.2
Yet, various characteristics suggest that the sample does not match the described task ideally. In these 
communication studies, errors are often identified at a very detailed level, including errors that are often 
corrected later in a transaction – and thus not relevant with focus on unrecovered errors. On the other hand, 
the ‘proceduralisation’ parameter (see previously) is not indicated for most of the records, which may have 
excluded relevant examples from our sample. 
  
Further selection (not possible within the scope of this report) for this task should therefore be based on 
analysis of titles and task summaries to allow a focus on unrecovered errors, but also include further examples 
(without indication of ‘proceduralisation’). A quick search shows that studies of Air Traffic Control (included in 
COREDATA) report a frequency of 1E-3 for ‘unrecovered error in pilot readback’ (Cardosi 1994), where 
‘Readback errors’ can be taken as an indication of a failure in the original message. 
While the sample may thus be improved, the results are nevertheless reasonably compatible with the estimate 
provided. 
Generic task 4: Communication, nonroutine 
Definition 
Unforeseen, novel content, where no template – or only a rudimentary one – is available. 
Includes more interactive types of communication and is thus less ‘one-way’ than the transmission 
(reporting/receiving) of a message. 
                                                            
2 Many records (in COREDATA) with a relatively high HEP – higher than the estimate suggested by Kirwan – come from the 
same study (Morrow et al. 1993). 
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Less structured than task 3 and thus a lower knowledge of what to communicate, what to expect the other 
party to state – less knowledge of the context of the other party and therefore less ability to understand what 
must be communicated to promote understanding.   
May include communication about emergency situation, which would imply some level of stress, compared 
with similar, non-emergency tasks (see discussion under task 3) 
References 
Kirwan (table A.3): '7. General error rate for oral communication', HEP = 3E-2.  
Estimates 
Our estimate is directly based on Kirwan’s example, which is higher than for task 3, as expected. 
HEP (task 4) = 3E-2
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
. 
• Driver reporting unauthorised evacuation of train 
• Driver reporting impact with unknown object 
• Non-railway competent person calling -Signalman (e.g. emergency services) 
• Signalman receiving request for impromptu possession 
• Railway emergency call 
Sampled records 
Selection criteria 
Out of 116 communication records, tasks with some degree of problem solving (‘4’ or ‘5’) are selected: yielding 
3 records
See Appendix B for the list of sampled records (p. 
. 
37). 
Diagram showing distribution of modes and probability intervals 
Neither diagram nor mean value is relevant for only three values. 
Comments on estimate, data and method 
We have not been able to select an adequate sample to provide examples for task 4. This is because data in 
COREDATA are from studies of highly structured communication, with no or very few examples of unstruc-
tured, nonroutine communication. Relevant examples might be found in other types of studies, although it 
may be expected that the definition of ‘error’ is more controversial for less structured communication. Further 
studies of railway communication are recommended to provide relevant data. 
The estimate is thus neither justified nor challenged by the data, but remains a reasonable fit with our task 
description. 
Generic task 5: Emergency scenarios – known 
General note on emergency tasks 5 and 6 
Generic tasks 5 and 6 are both emergency tasks. They share the essential task aspects of urgency and devia-
tion from normal operating conditions, but they are distinguished by two dimensions: 1) level of urgency 
(which is related to ‘time pressure’, with the additional aspect that negative outcome will ensue if not 
performed correctly on time) and 2) availability of a script and relevant information. Urgency is related to 
either safety or production pressure, and the latter may in turn lead to safety risks. 
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Definition 
Fairly simple task characterized by some urgency and stress due to safety or production concerns, for which a 
plan of action (a script) and relevant information are available. May also include ‘complicated non-routine’ and 
‘unfamiliar/undefined’ tasks that are mission critical (task failure may involve major safety or efficiency 
breaches). 
These characteristics overlaps somewhat with two PSFs, time pressure and job aid. Stress is not identical to 
time pressure, but implies that there already is some time pressure in the task. The PSF should therefore only 
be used with caution, and never 100%. Preferably, increased time pressure may give reason to consider 
generic task 6 instead. Similarly, availability of a script implies that some ‘job aid’ (a PSF) is already included in 
task architecture, which and task 5 is therefore not susceptible to improvement corresponding to a 100 % 
multiplier. 
References 
Two relevant examples from Kirwan’s ‘generic guideline data’ (table A.3):  
• Kirwan 2: “Complicated non-routine task, with stress”, HEP=3E-1.  
• Kirwan 5: “Operator fails to act correctly in the first 30 minutes of a stressful emergency situation”, HEP 
= 1E-1. 
While the latter, ‘Kirwan 5’, does emphasize emergency, the specification of a time frame renders a match 
with our task definitions quite difficult. The first, ‘Kirwan 2’, emphasizes stress but seems to imply more 
complexity than indicated for task 5. 
Estimates 
We suggest a modified version of the ‘Kirwan 2’ task mentioned above. We modify  to take account of lower 
degree of complexity, and because estimate for task 5 must be better than task 6: 
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
1E-1 
• Signalman reaction to report of a person being struck by a train 
• Signalman apply emergency stop to specified area 
• Driver reacting on instruction to bring train to a standstill immediately 
• Authorised evacuation of train 
• Driver observing unauthorised person on the tracks 
• Driver reaction to impact with an object 
• Signalman identifying the need for an emergency catenary isolation 
• Signalman response to broken overhead wire 
• Signalman applying emergency stop to individual train 
Sampled records 
Selection criteria 
Selection of examples of this task and generic task 6 (unknown) are based on 93 records with emergency tasks 
(see p.7).  
Highly proceduralised (proceduralisation ≤ 2, see previously) tasks are selected as examples of ‘Emergency-
known’, yielding a total of: 35 records
See Appendix B for the list of sampled records (p. 
. 
37). 
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Diagram showing distribution of modes and probability intervals 
 
Median of HEP: 0.0235 
Comments on estimate, data and method 
The median for this sample is lower than the suggested estimate for this task by a factor 4. This may be 
because many failures in the sample are for very simple subtasks in an emergency scenario. Furthermore, 
most examples are from the same study of a very specific scenario, “Offshore Lifeboat evacuation”, making the 
sample very narrow and less representative. Nevertheless, it does indicate that the estimate arrived at is fairly 
high, which also confirms the concern that error rate for task 5 should be sufficiently low to ‘leave room’ for 
task 6 as the most error-prone one. However, for lack of further references for this task we are obliged to 
maintain the estimate suggested above. Hickling also provides an estimate of a generic task which is 
somewhat overlapping with our generic task 5, namely his “complex task requiring a high level of 
understanding and skill” (Hickling 2007: Table 3, p.65). 
Generic task 6: Emergency scenarios – unknown 
Definition 
Task characterized by high degree of urgency and stress due to safety or production concerns, where no 
adequate plan of action (a script) is available, and relevant information is uncertain or missing. 
It differs from task 5 both by the absence of script and scarcity of relevant information, and by increased 
urgency – related to either safety or production pressure. 
The definition of this task already includes error-producing PSFs. On the other hand, there is moderate poten-
tial for improvement by adding supervision. (However, compare remarks in the introduction about establishing 
resilient organizations). 
References 
Two estimates from the literature seem relevant, the first of Kirwan’s ‘generic guideline data’ (table A.3): “1. 
General rate for errors involving very high stress levels” (HEP=3E-1) and GTT A in HEART (see table A.1): 
“Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely consequences” (HEP=0.55). 
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Estimates 
We suggest the lower of the two values as the estimate: 
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
3E-1 
• Signalman reaction to report of unspecified disaster 
• Unauthorised evacuation of train initiated by passengers 
• Major system breakdown – Signalmen lost indications on signalling control display 
• Signalman to identify need to stop traffic in neighbouring infrastructure 
Sampled records 
Selection criteria 
Based on the same set of 93 emergency records (see previous task), tasks indicated with some degree of 
problem solving (3 to 5) are selected: a total of 58 records
See Appendix B for the list of sampled records (p. 
. 
38). 
Diagram showing distribution of modes and probability intervals 
 
Median of HEP: 0.02851 
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Comments on estimate, data and method 
The median for these examples is lower than expected for ‘emergency - unknown’ tasks – not much higher 
than the previous estimate for ‘emergency – known’. This may be because many examples are quite well-
defined tasks. Only very few are indicated with the highest degree of problem solving, which suggests that the 
use of this parameter is insufficient to identify tasks without script or relevant information. Furthermore, 
several examples are parts of cutsets, representing errors related to and/or depending on other errors, and 
thus with a complicated relation to specific tasks. 
It may be possible to make a further analysis and selection based on titles and task summaries, and compari-
son with examples provided by Banedanmark, possibly by including other studies, but this would be outside 
the scope of the present report. 
We maintain the estimate suggested, since it is based on references, and the definition of task 6 seems to 
imply a higher error rate than most of the tasks from the sample. 
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2. Performance shaping factors 
There is an overlap between Generic Task Types and Performance Shaping Factors (PSF)3
There are various reasons for using certain parameters (factors) as PSFs rather than task definition. 
. Some factors can be 
defined either as a parameter in the definition of task types (and the distinction between tasks) or as PSF, for 
instance “Task competition”. The allocation of such factors either to task types or to a PSF is a matter of 
choice. But one should be careful – in definitions and/or use – to avoid counting the same factor twice (both as 
part of the task and as PSF). 
1) To describe factors that are external to the task itself 
2) To isolate characteristics common to several task types. This will allow a more simple definition of task 
types, with fewer types 
Factors considered but chosen as task parameters 
Familiarity is regarded as depending on the frequency of the task – and thus both as task parameters. 
Stress is treated as part of (some of) the generic task descriptions. The immediate BDK use of the parameter is 
for procedure and system design with an assumption on a standard human performance capability. Thus stress 
can be counted as an inherent factor of the tasks and not considered as a PSF. For specific task analysis in e.g. 
incident investigation and analysis this reduction would probably not be advisable but for the intended use it 
can be justified. 
Factors considered but not included 
• Level of Skill (requirement) and Experience will affect operator performance. However, the method 
presented here will be used in the design of a new system, where it is assumed that operators are 
qualified for the tasks they perform. Challenges with matching tasks to skills and experience may be 
considered at a later occasion requiring a more detailed analysis. 
• Procedures: Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are a common method of enhancing task perfor-
mance in all safety-critical industries. They certainly aid the reliability of simple and sequential tasks, 
but also have their limitations when operators face uncertainties and ill-defined contexts requiring 
judgment and situation assessment. In our list of PSFs we have not included procedures, because 
Banedanmark tasks of type 1, 3 and 5 must be assumed to be supported by procedures. 
Note on application of PSFs 
A PSF is normally applied by multiplying HEP for a specific task with the appropriate multiplier, e.g. an ‘emer-
gency – known’ may be improved by supervision, resulting in a HEP = 0.5 * 1E-1 = 5E-2. Often, however, it will 
not be reasonable to use the ‘full’ multiplier, either because the PSF is only partly active, e.g. limited time 
pressure or a simple job aid, or because the PSF is already partly implied in the generic task definition. In this 
case, a ‘partial’ multiplier can be applied, using a value between 1 (no effect) and the full multiplier (> 1 for 
negative PSFs, <1 for positive PSFs). For example, a simple routine task may occur under medium time pres-
sure: HEP = 2 E-3 * 5 = 1 E-2. 
Performance Shaping Factors selected for Banedanmark 
Four performance factors have been selected in agreement with Banedanmark. Two of the PSFs – time 
pressure and task competition – represent negative conditions that can increase error rates, while the other 
                                                            
3 Performance Shaping Factors are also referred to by other labels in the HRA literature, such as Performance Factors (PF) 
(Cullen et al 2004) or Error Producing Conditions (EPC) in HEART (Kirwan 1994;Williams 1986). 
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two – supervision and job aid – represent potential improvements that can be added to reduce error rate but 
will require an investment of resources (e.g. extra use of personnel or extra equipment). 
 
Table of Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) 
Performance Shaping Factors 
Titel Explanation Multi-plier References 
Caution for 
’double 
counting’ 
Tasks, PSFs 
1. Supervision Having a supervisor who monitors or who is in the 
background or on call will generally improve reliability and 
thus reduce the error rate. 
0.5 (Dickinson & 
Lowe 
2007;Weber 
1992) 
 
2. Job aids Different types of aids or tools will support the operator 
and reduce the error rate. E.g. a checklist to support 
memory; alarm to direct attention; a fixed format for 
communication may reduce omissions or 
misunderstandings 
0.1 (Cullen et al 
2004) 
3;5 
3. Task com-
petition 
Error rates increase when an operator must perform more 
than one task at the same time, e.g. when being distracted 
by other tasks and thus forced to prioritize 
6 (Cullen et al 
2004) 
PSF 4 
4. Time pres-
sure 
Error rates increase when operator is under time pressure 11 (Williams 
1986) 
5;6; PSF 3 
 
PSF 1 - Supervision 
Definition 
Having a supervisor who monitors or who is in the background or on call will generally improve reliability and 
thus reduce the error rate. The supervisor can check and correct actions, but also has other roles, e.g. by 
providing ‘focused attention/supervision’ (Dickinson & Lowe 2007:227) on critical events, thus relieving opera-
tors in emergency situations (tasks 5 and 6) or reduce the effect of ‘task competition’ (PSF). 
Discussion 
There is a potential overlap/conflict with PSF ‘time pressure’ in the sense that some benefits of supervision 
depend on adequate time to check and intervene. High ‘time pressure’ will reduce this benefit of supervision.  
References 
Supervision can be identified in HEART as one of the factors implied in the ‘multiplier’ identified by comparing 
GTTs B and F (see previously). The ‘B/F multiplier’, ca. 1/90. thus represents a product of three factors: super-
vision, procedures and reversibility. 
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According to Weber, supervision reduces errors by 50%: “it has been suggested that 50 % of unsafe acts could 
be eliminated by the use of effective supervisors” (Weber 1992) referred in (Dickinson & Lowe 2007:225). 
HEART EPC (negative): “17. Little or no independent checking or testing of output”: *3 (table A.2). 
Estimated value 
We recommend the value suggested by Weber: 0.5
It seems fair to assume that the two other elements in the ‘B/F multiplier’, reversibility and procedures, are 
somewhat more effective – in order to arrive at a total product of 1/90. 
. 
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
- Second person available to correct actions in real time, e.g. second Driver repeating restrictive indica-
tions on the DMI 
- Verification by other person, e.g. Signalman verifying O&M coordinator planning of temporary speed 
restriction 
PSF 2 - Job aids 
Definition 
A job aid is an external, physical or electronic artifact which is associated with a procedure such that the arti-
fact and the procedure support the execution of a task. All job aids are associated with one or several proce-
dures, but not all procedures are accompanied by a job aid. A job aid can be in the form of a checklist that sup-
ports memory; an alarm that aids supervision tasks or brings attention to a task that requires immediate atten-
tion, etc. 
Discussion 
While job aids typically have a positive impact on performance and reliability, we may also take into account 
sources treating them as a negative PSF. Procedures can influence performance negatively in various: lacking 
where demanded, unclear, outdated, frequent changes, contradicting (Cullen et al 2004:132;Kirwan 
1994:228). In this case, we focus on the difference between procedures and “no procedures, even though the 
task needs them” (Kirwan 1994:228) or procedures that “do not specify clearly what the driver is required to do 
(e.g. no procedure in place for a particular, unusual circumstance)” (Cullen et al 2004:132), while assuming that 
they are not unclear or conflicting, since the method presented in this report is to be used for the design of a 
future system. Nevertheless, one should be aware that not all tasks can simply be improved by a job aid that 
implies a specific structuring, e.g. if the implied structure is too inflexible to fit the context. 
The ambiguous benefits of job aids are also indicated by the fact that ‘inadequate human machine interfaces’ 
are also treated as a negative PSF (Kirwan 2008:12). For the purposes of this report, we shall assume that a 
planned job aid will be adequate, though with a caution against regarding it as a universal medicine, and a 
preference for a modest estimate. 
References 
 ‘Job aid’ seems to constitute the main difference between two GTTs in HEART (table A.1):  
• G: “without the benefit of significant job aids”, HEP=4E-4),  
• H: “an augmented or automated supervisory system providing accurate interpretation of system 
stage”, HEP=2E-5.  
The main difference between the two task is “automated support” (Hickling 2007:63) or a very significant job 
aid, representing an improvement multiplier of = 20. 
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A considerably less powerful multiplier may be identified from a negative PSF in the RSSB tool: ‘No progress 
tracking’, explained as “no means (e.g. checklist) of tracking progress on a sequence of tasks”, increasing error 
rates by 1.4 (Cullen et al 2004:124). This is a negative multiplier representing lack of ‘means’, whereas the 
availability of such means (a particular type of job aid) would improve error rates by the inverse factor. 
The RSSB tool has PSF multiplier for (lack of) ‘Procedures clarity’ = 5 (Cullen et al 2004:122). While the full 
multiplier represents conflicting procedures, a reduced value may probably be applied for ‘missing proce-
dures’. Problems with procedures are also mentioned in another PF in the RSSB tool: ‘Information quality & 
availability’ – “of information given in procedure …”: 3 (Cullen et al 2004:122). 
Estimated value 
We recommend a relatively modest multiplier, at a value that is half the one derived from comparing the two 
HEART tasks.  
Job aid multiplier = 0.1
For any particular case it must be assessed whether full multiplier weight should be applied, since the effect of 
job aids vary considerably. 
. 
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
- Written Orders to assist message exchange 
- Reminder applications, e.g. indications of active possessions, temporary speed restrictions etc. 
- Checklists 
- Decision support system 
- Dual-faced stop markers indication work site limit 
- Handheld terminal to support PICOP requesting track possession 
PSF 3 - Task competition 
Definition 
Task competition applies when an operator must perform more than one task at the same time. This also 
includes situations when an operator is distracted by other tasks and thus forced to prioritize.  
Discussion 
Task competition differs from ‘simple’ distraction, which implies a clear difference and priority between 
primary task and distracters: in ‘task competitions’, there is no clear priority among the competing tasks. It 
implies a higher workload/time pressure, but with the extra challenge from the simultaneousness and unclear 
priority that complicates queuing of tasks. 
References 
Distraction seems implied in a task type in Kirwan (Table A.3): '4. Non-routine operation, with other duties at 
the same time', HEP=1E-1, although he does not provide a comparable estimate for the ‘complementary’ ‘non-
routine operation’, which would have allowed calculating a multiplier for ‘other duties at the same time’.  
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The RSSB tool has a PSF multiplier = 6 for ‘High workload’, the definition also emphasizing multi-tasking: “High 
levels of driver workload due to multi-tasking requirements, disruption/faults, DOO operations, complex route 
etc.” = *6 (Table A.4)4
The RSSB also has a very modest PSF multiplier for ‘Distraction/3rd parties’ (RSSB tool) = 1.03  (Cullen et al 
2004:124) (Table A.4).This multiplier is so low and insignificant that one could suspect a mistake? In any case, 
the examples provided generally suggest secondary distracters rather than competing tasks. On the other 
hand, part of the definition suggests otherwise: “preoccupied by an issue of concern” (although that issue 
might be private rather than work-related). 
. 
Estimated value 
We recommend using the RSSB multiplier for ‘high workload’, although that definition implies a caution 
against using it together with PSF time pressure. 
Task competition multiplier = 6 
Rail examples from Banedanmark 
- Several duties at once e.g. dispatching and traffic information 
- More than one railway emergency 
PSF 4 - Time pressure 
Definition 
Time pressure is an active performance shaping factor whenever an operator must perform one or several 
tasks at a rate which is close to the operator’s time/error performance ceiling. 
Discussion 
Time pressure corresponds to a higher workload, but does not imply simultaneous tasks with unclear priorities 
(see PSF 3).  
Time pressure means less time for error detection and correction. On the one hand, this reduces some bene-
fits of PSF ‘supervision’. On the other hand, such a supervisor could relieve the workload by performing some 
of the tasks. 
It may be assumed that some time pressure already exists in emergency tasks – therefore, this PSF cannot be 
applied fully to tasks 5 and 6. 
References 
Time as parameter ('speed', 'rapidly', 'time to correct') may be identified in the definitions of most GTTs in 
HEART (A,D,E,G), but here is an appropriate EPC: “2. A shortage of time available for error detection and cor-
rection” (Williams 1986) (Table A.2), which was also used directly in the RSSB tool (table A.4). 
Estimated value 
We recommend using the HEART EPC directly: 
PSF time pressure = 
                                                            
4 This is probably an adaptation of HEART EPC “8 A channel capacity overload, particularly one caused by simultaneous 
presentation of non-redundant information” (table A.2), although this definition specifically emphasizes information 
overload. 
11. 
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Rail examples from Banedanmark 
- Immediate evacuation required due to unsafe situation on a train 
- External conditions not yet in place to allow safe evacuation (e.g. broken overhead wire in the vicinity 
of a train on fire). 
- Build up of tasks due to follow-on deviation resulting from initial deviation from plan. 
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Appendix A. Supporting tables 
Table A.1 HEART Generic categories 
Eight generic categories, A-H, in HEART. From (Kirwan 1994, p.237) 
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Table A.2 HEART Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) 
Twenty-six error-producing conditions defined in HEART. EPCs are similar to Performance Shaping Factors. 
From (Kirwan 1994, p.238). 
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Table A.3 Kirwan generic guideline data. 
A table of eighteen generic guideline data presented by Kirwan. From (Kirwan 1994, p.379) 
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Table A.4 Performance Factors from RSSB Human Error Quantification 
(Cullen et al 2004:Appendix 10) 
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Table A.5 Examples of Performance Shaping Factors cited in first-generation HRA 
tools 
 
From (Lee et al. 2011): 
 
 
 
Table A.6 Examples of Performance Shaping Factors cited in second-generation 
HRA tools  
From (Lee et al 2011): 
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Appendix B. Reference records (COREDATA database) 
 
Sampled records 
Generic task 1 – Sample A: Study based on expert judgments 
 
Short_Title 
Nuclear Power plant operation - No action on 5 annunciators alarming 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Incorrect reading of digital indicator 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Wrong choice of valve (adequate labelling) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Wrong switch choice (arranged with clearly drawn mimic lines) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Switch turned in wrong direction 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Reading wrong meter (arranged with clearly drawn mimic lines) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Incorrect interpretation of value shown on a chart recorder when the chart recorder 
has normal bands indicated on the scale 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Wrong Switch Choice (grouped according to function) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Select the wrong circuit breaker 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Failure to realize that a valve is not in its proper position 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Meter out of range not noticed 
Nuclear Power plant operation -Setting 10-position rotary selector switch to wrong position 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Wrong switch choice (Identified by labels) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Reading wrong meter (grouped according to their function) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Incorrectly reads graph 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Reading wrong meter (identified by labels only) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Wrong choice of valve (inadequate labelling) 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Jammed meter not recognised 
Nuclear Power plant operation - Failure to act on 1 out of 10 alarming annunciators 
 
Generic task 1 – Sample B: Tasks performed weekly or more frequent 
 
Short_Title 
Unrecovered omission errors per character entered 
Waste handling error 
Accidental override of a safety interlock 
Nuclear -Waste Handling 
Nuclear - Tank Discharge Valves 
Optimal training regime 
Manipulation of numbers using a pocket calculator 
Unrecovered commission errors per character entered 
Look-up values in a table 
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Manufacturing - inadvertent puncturing of bellows in a motor 
Non-optimal training regime 
Door safety mechanism deliberately disabled 
Keying numerics without a short term memory demand 
Keying numerics with a short term memory demand - early digits 
Dial an incorrect 10 digit number using a conventional keyphone 
Errors per character entered 
Manufacturing - inadequate coating of a surface 
Manufacturing - leak testing 
Dial an incorrect 10 digit number using a capacitative telephone key pad 
Dial an incorrect 10 digit number using a membrane telephone key pad 
Keying numerics with a short term memory demand - later digit 
Do not recover from an error 
 
Generic task 2: Nontrivial, familiar 
 
Short_Title 
Omit positioning of a control switch 
Nuclear - Chemical discharge 
Permit to work - fail to identify obscure hazard during preparation of a confined space entry permit 
Chemical industry - select an invalid button at a central control panel 
Permit to work - inadequate definition of equipment location 
Permit to work - complete a task using methods outside the scope of the permit to work 
Chemical industry - input an incorrect numeric setpoint at a central control panel 
Chemical industry - control action unsuitable for the equipment state 
Permit to work - personal protective equipment inadequately specified 
Chemical industry - input incorrect alphanumeric equipment identifier at a central control panel 
Numeric ranking exercise - provide incorrect answer 
Numeric ranking exercise - misunderstanding a question 
Air traffic control - touch the wrong part of a touch screen 
 
Generic task 3: Communication, routine 
 
Short_Title 
Strip Marking Error 
Relative Speeds are Misjudged 
Wrong Aircraft Instructed 
Climb/Descent Misjudgement 
Headings are Misjudged 
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Readback Error 
Unrecovered readback errors per aircraft controlled 
Routine air traffic control communication - pilot responds to message intended for another plane 
Callsign Confusion 
Unrecovered strip marking errors per aircraft controlled 
Routine air traffic control communication - pilot error in read back 
Routine air traffic control communication - missing acknowledgement 
Routine air traffic control communication - partial readback 
Unrecovered readback errors per hour 
Routine air traffic control communication - missing readback 
Unrecovered strip marking errors per hour 
Routine air traffic control communication - missing or partial readback 
Routine air traffic control communication - controller fails to correct a pilot error in read back 
Routine air traffic control communication - controller fails to identify that the wrong pilot has responded to their 
message 
 
Generic task 4: Communication, nonroutine 
Problem solving 
Short_Title 
Split Sector not Coordinated Adequately 
Radar Conflict Alert is Assumed to be a False Alarm 
A Loss of Separation is Occurring but ATCO does Nothing 
 
Decision Making 
Short_Title 
Headings are Misjudged 
Climb/Descent Misjudgement 
Relative Speeds are Misjudged 
Radar Conflict Alert is Assumed to be a False Alarm 
A Loss of Separation is Occurring but ATCO does Nothing 
 
Generic task 5: Emergency scenarios – known 
 
Short_Title 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Failure to start lifeboat engine at any point in the evacuation   CONTROLLED 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation /Failure to start the engine before the boat is lowered CONTROLLED 
Nuclear power plant operation - initiate residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Failure to start lifeboat engine at any point in the evacuation   SEVERE 
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Offshore Lifeboat evacuation /Failure to start the engine before the boat is lowered SEVERE 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Check wheel is positioned to clear installation  CONTROLLED 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Check wheel is positioned to clear installation  SEVERE 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Ensure hatches and doors secure - omitted  CONTROLLED 
Nuclear power plant operation - restoring offsite power before attempting to restore power using the diesel generation. 
Engagement of forward gear and full throttle 
Lifeboat driven without disengagement 
Hooks not properly disengaged 
Hooks reset too early 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Early removal of retaining pin 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Ensure crew securely strapped in. CONTROLLED 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Break cable not operated long enough CONTROLLED 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Attempting to drive the boat without disengaging the boat from the hooks 
CONTROLLED 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation /Ensure that drop zone is clear CONTROLLED 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Omit 6 second purge   CONTROLLED 
Omission of an emergency event task when procedures are available 
Omit 6 second purge 
Offshore Lifeboat Evacuation / Omit check of fuel tap slackage 
Offshore Lifeboat Evacuation / Initiation of air support system 
Unable to disengage boat in one quick movement 
Operation of break cable too short 
Incorrect disengagement of hooks 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Ensure hatches and doors secure - omitted  SEVERE 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Break cable not operated long enough   SEVERE 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation /Ensure that drop zone is clear SEVERE 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Monitor compass to ensure leaving platform at 90  degrees. CONTROLLED 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Attempting to drive the boat without disengaging the boat from the hooks SEVERE 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Ensure crew securely strapped in. SEVERE 
Omission of wind speed, direction and sea state check 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Omit 6 second purge   SEVERE 
Offshore Lifeboat evacuation / Monitor compass to ensure leaving platform at 90 degrees. SEVERE 
Generic task 6: Emergency scenarios – unknown 
 
Short_Title 
Nuclear plant - for a well defined mimic layout: failure to recover from selecting and operating the wrong control 
during an emergency event 
Nuclear plant - fail to recover from error of turning a control in the wrong direction (when the correct control direction 
is opposite to typical operator expectation) during an emergency event 
A Loss of Separation is Occurring but ATCO does Nothing 
Nuclear power plant operation - failure to initiate the standby liquid control (SLC) during an emergency. 
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Drilling for oil/gas offshore - pump liquid too slowly through the drilling system leading to a further emergency event 
Nuclear power plant operation - Actuate the suppression pool cooling mode during an emergency 
Nuclear power plant operation - Scramming the reactor during an emergency. 
Nuclear power plant operation - failure to manually insert rods during an emergency 
Nuclear power plant operation - restoring residual heat removal cooling within 10 minutes during an emergency 
Nuclear plant - for controls in a well defined mimic layout: select and operate the wrong control during an emergency 
event 
Nuclear power plant operation - actuate the manual depressurisation system during an emergency 
Nuclear plant - for controls which are functionally grouped: select and operate the wrong control during an emergency 
event 
Nuclear power plant operation - operate the nuclear instrumentation system during an emergency 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - carry out emergency control action too fast 
Nuclear power plant operation -  manually operate the reactor core isolation cooling system during an emergency 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - operator fails to isolate drilling equipment but failure is subsequently identified by other 
rig personnel 
Nuclear plant - select and operate the wrong control during an emergency event 
Nuclear plant - Incorrect setting of a multi-position selector switch during an emergency event 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - fail to control emergency event, leading to a leak of gas/oil 
Nuclear power plant operation - initiate residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system after a high pressure 
pool temperature alarm 
Nuclear plant - for controls with labels only: select and operate the wrong control during an emergency event 
Nuclear plant - Incorrect operation of a manual control during an emergency event 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - calculation incorrectly performed during an emergency 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - too much pressure in system when circulating fluid 
Nuclear power plant operation - Taking appropriate action to  prevent potential high pressure coolent injection system 
failure during an emergency. 
Nuclear plant - turn control in wrong direction (when the control direction is the same as typical operator expectation) 
during an emergency event 
Nuclear plant - operate a control incorrectly during an emergency 
Omission errors during emergency events 
Omission of an emergency event task step 
Nuclear power plant operation - open valves within one hour in an emergency 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - fail to control system pressure during an emergency 
Nuclear plant - fail to recover from error of turning control in wrong direction (when the control direction is the same 
as typical operator expectation) during an emergency event 
Nuclear plant - failure to recover from incorrectly operating a control during an emergency 
Omission of an emergency event task (includes events with and without written procedures) 
Nuclear power plant operation - Ventilation to cool vital system equipment during an emergency. 
Omission of an emergency event task when procedures are not available 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - choke control opened too much 
Commission errors during emergency events 
Extraneous errors during emergency events 
Nuclear power plant operation - Realization of Potential high pressure coolent injection system failure during an 
emergency. 
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Drilling for oil/gas offshore - failure to maintain constant pressure due to mis-setting a control 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - finish emergency task too early 
Diagnosis and response using hardcopy procedures 
All errors during emergency operation using computer-based procedures 
Nuclear plant - Failure to recover from the incorrect operation of a manual control during an emergency event 
All errors during emergency operation using hard copy, paper-based procedures 
Nuclear plant - Fail to recover from error of incorrectly setting of a multi-position selector switch during an 
emergency event 
Drilling for oil/gas offshore - selects incorrect process variable to record 
Nuclear plant - turn control in wrong direction (when the correct control direction is opposite to typical operator 
expectation) during an emergency event 
Diagnosis and response using hardcopy or computerised procedures 
Nuclear plant - for functionally grouped controls: failure to recover from selecting and operating the wrong control 
during an emergency event 
Diagnosis and response using computerised procedures 
Transient 1: Failure in complex diagnosis and response in a central control room using the DISKET decision support 
tool 
Nuclear plant - failure to recover from selecting and operating the wrong control during an emergency event 
Transient 2: Failure in complex diagnosis and response in a central control room using the DISKET decision support 
tool 
Nuclear plant - for controls differentiated by text labels only: failure to recover from selecting and operating the wrong 
control during an emergency event 
Transient 1: complex diagnosis and response using a standard NPP central control room interface 
Transient 2: Failure in complex diagnosis and response using a standard NPP central control room interface 
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